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Abstract
Adversarial examples are known as carefully perturbed
images fooling image classifiers. We propose a geometric
framework to generate adversarial examples in one of the
most challenging black-box settings where the adversary
can only generate a small number of queries, each of them
returning the top-1 label of the classifier. Our framework
is based on the observation that the decision boundary of
deep networks usually has a small mean curvature in the
vicinity of data samples. We propose an effective iterative
algorithm to generate query-efficient black-box perturba-
tions with small `p norms for p ≥ 1, which is confirmed
via experimental evaluations on state-of-the-art natural im-
age classifiers. Moreover, for p = 2, we theoretically show
that our algorithm actually converges to the minimal `2-
perturbation when the curvature of the decision boundary
is bounded. We also obtain the optimal distribution of the
queries over the iterations of the algorithm. Finally, exper-
imental results confirm that our principled black-box attack
algorithm performs better than state-of-the-art algorithms
as it generates smaller perturbations with a reduced num-
ber of queries.1
1. Introduction
It has become well known that deep neural networks
are vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations, which are
carefully designed to cause miss-classification in state-of-
the-art image classifiers [29]. Many methods have been
proposed to evaluate adversarial robustness of classifiers in
the white-box setting, where the adversary has full access
to the target model [15, 27, 3]. However, the robustness of
classifiers in black-box settings – where the adversary has
only access to the output of the classifier – is of high rel-
evance in many real-world applications of deep neural net-
1The code of GeoDA is available at https://github.com/
thisisalirah/GeoDA.
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Figure 1: Linearization of the decision boundary.
works such as autonomous systems and healthcare, where it
poses serious security threats. Several black-box evaluation
methods have been proposed in the literature. Depending
on what the classifier gives as an output, black-box evalua-
tion methods are either score-based [28, 6, 20] or decision-
based [4, 2, 22].
In this paper, we propose a novel geometric framework
for decision-based black-box attacks in which the adversary
only has access to the top-1 label of the target model. In-
tuitively small adversarial perturbations should be searched
in directions where the classifier decision boundary comes
close to data samples. We exploit the low mean curvature
of the decision boundary in the vicinity of the data sam-
ples to effectively estimate the normal vector to the decision
boundary. This key prior permits to considerably reduces
the number of queries that are necessary to fool the black-
box classifier. Experimental results confirm that our Geo-
metric Decision-based Attack (GeoDA) outperforms state-
of-the-art black-box attacks, in terms of required number
of queries to fool the classifier. Our main contributions are
summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel geometric framework based on lin-
earizing the decision boundary of deep networks in the
vicinity of samples. The error for the estimation of
the normal vector to the decision boundary of clas-
sifiers with flat decision boundaries, including linear
classifiers, is shown to be bounded in a non-asymptotic
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regime. The proposed framework is general enough to
be deployed for any classifier with low curvature deci-
sion boundary.
• We demonstrate how our proposed framework can be
used to generate query-efficient `p black-box perturba-
tions. In particular, we provide algorithms to generate
perturbations for p ≥ 1, and show their effectiveness
via experimental evaluations on state-of-the-art natu-
ral image classifiers. In the case of p = 2, we also
prove that our algorithm converges to the minimal `2-
perturbation. We further derive the optimal number of
queries for each step of the iterative search strategy.
• Finally, we show that our framework can incorporate
different prior information, particularly transferability
and subspace constraints on the adversarial perturba-
tions. We show theoretically that having prior infor-
mation can bias the normal vector estimation search
space towards a more accurate estimation.
2. Related work
Adversarial examples can be crafted in white-box set-
ting [15, 27, 3], score-based black-box setting [28, 6, 20] or
decision-based black-box scenario [4, 2, 22]. The latter set-
tings are obviously the most challenging as little is known
about the target classification settings. Yet, there are several
recent works on the black-box attacks on image classifiers
[20, 21, 32]. However, they assume that the loss function,
the prediction probabilities, or several top sorted labels are
available, which may be unrealistic in many real-world sce-
narios. In the most challenging settings, there are a few at-
tacks that exploit only the top-1 label information returned
by the classifier, including the Boundary Attack (BA) [2],
the HopSkipJump Attack (HSJA) [5], the OPT attack [8],
and qFool [22]. In [2], by starting from a large adversar-
ial perturbation, BA can iteratively reduce the norm of the
perturbation. In [5], the authors provided an attack based
on [2] that improves the BA taking the advantage of an esti-
mated gradient. This attack is quite query efficient and can
be assumed as the state-of-the-art baseline in the black-box
setting. In [8], an optimization-based hard-label black-box
attack algorithm is introduced with guaranteed convergence
rate in the hard-label black-box setting which outperforms
the BA in terms of number of queries. Closer to our work,
in [22], a heuristic algorithm based on the estimation of the
normal vector to decision boundary is proposed for the case
of `2-norm perturbations.
Most of the aforementioned attacks are however specifi-
cally designed for minimizing perturbation metrics such `2
and `∞ norms, and mostly use heuristics. In contrast, we
introduce a powerful and generic framework grounded on
the geometric properties of the decision boundary of deep
networks, and propose a principled approach to design effi-
cient algorithms to generate general `p-norm perturbations,
in which [22] can be seen as a special case. We also provide
convergence guarantees for the `2-norm perturbations. We
obtained the optimal distribution of queries over iterations
theoretically as well which permits to use the queries in a
more efficient manner. Moreover, the parameters of our al-
gorithm are further determined via empirical and theoretical
analysis, not merely based on heuristics as done in [22].
3. Problem statement
Let us assume that we have a pre-trained L-class classi-
fier with parameters θ represented as f : Rd → RL, where
x ∈ Rd is the input image and kˆ(x) = argmaxk fk(x) is
the top-1 classification label where fk(x) is the kth compo-
nent of f(x) corresponds to the kth class. We consider the
non-targeted black-box attack, where an adversary without
any knowledge on θ computes an adversarial perturbation
v to change the estimated label of an image x to any in-
correct label, i.e., kˆ(x + v) 6= kˆ(x). The distance metric
D(x,x + v) can be any function including the `p norms.
We assume a general form optimization problem in which
the goal is to fool the classifier while D(x,x + v) is mini-
mized as:
min
v
D(x,x+ v)
s.t. kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x). (1)
Finding a solution for (1) is a hard problem in general. To
obtain an efficient approximate solution, one can try to es-
timate the point of the classifier decision boundary that is
the closest to the data point x. Crafting an small adver-
sarial perturbation then consists in pushing the data point
beyond the decision boundary in the direction of its nor-
mal. The normal to the decision boundary is thus critical
in a geometry-based attack. While it can be obtained us-
ing back-propagation in white box settings (e.g., [27]), its
estimation in black-box settings becomes challenging.
The key idea here is to exploit the geometric proper-
ties of the decision boundary in deep networks for effec-
tive estimation in black-box settings. In particular, it has
been shown that the decision boundaries of the state-of-the-
art deep networks have a quite low mean curvature in the
neighborhood of data samples [12]. Specifically, the deci-
sion boundary at the vicinity of a data point x can be locally
approximated by a hyperplane passing through a boundary
point xB close to x, with a normal vectorw [14, 13]. Thus,
by exploiting this property, the optimization problem in (1)
can be locally linearized as:
min
v
D(x,x+ v)
s.t. wT (x+ v)−wTxB = 0
(2)
Typically, xB is a point on the boundary, which can be
found by binary search with a small number of queries.
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However, solving the problem (2) is quite challenging in
black-box settings as one does not have any knowledge
about the parameters θ and can only access the top-1 la-
bel kˆ(x) of the image classifier. A query is a request that
results in the top-1 label of an image classifier for a given
input, which prevents the use of zero-order black box op-
timization methods [34, 33] that need more information to
compute adversarial perturbations. The goal of our method
is to estimate the normal vector to the decision boundary
w resorting to geometric priors with a minimal number of
queries to the classifier.
4. The estimator
We introduce an estimation method for the normal vec-
tor of classifiers with flat decision boundaries. It is worth
noting that the proposed estimation is not limited to deep
networks and applies to any classifier with low mean cur-
vature boundary. We denote the estimate of the vector w
normal to the flat decision boundary in (2) with wˆN when
N queries are used. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the boundary point xB is located at the origin. Thus,
according to (2), the decision boundary hyperplane passes
through the origin and we have wTx = 0 for any vector x
on the decision boundary hyperplane. In order to estimate
the normal vector to the decision boundary, the key idea is
to generate N samples ηi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} from a multi-
variate normal distribution ηi ∼ N (0,Σ). Then, we query
the image classifier N times to obtain the top-1 label output
for each xB + ηi, ∀i ∈ N . For a given data point x, if
wTx ≤ 0, the label is correct; if wTx ≥ 0, the classifier is
fooled. Hence, if the generated perturbations are adversar-
ial, they belong to the set
Sadv = {ηi | kˆ(xB + ηi) 6= kˆ(x)}
= {ηi | wTηi ≥ 0}. (3)
Similarly, the perturbations on the other side of the hyper-
plane, which lead to correct classification, belong to the set
Sclean = {ηi | kˆ(xB + ηi) = kˆ(x)}
= {ηi | wTηi ≤ 0}. (4)
The samples in each of the sets Sadv and Sclean can be as-
sumed as samples drawn from a hyperplane (wTx = 0)
truncated multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and
covariance matrix Σ. We define the PDF of the d dimen-
sional zero mean multivariate normal distribution with co-
variance matrix Σ as φd(η|Σ). We define Φd(b|Σ) =∫∞
b
φd(η|Σ)dη as cumulative distribution function of the
univariate normal distribution.
Lemma 1. Given a multivariate Gaussian distribution
N (0,Σ) truncated by the hyperplane wTx ≥ 0, the mean
µ and covariance matrixR of the hyperplane truncated dis-
tribution are given by:
µ = c1Σw (5)
where c1 = (Φd(0))−1φd(0) and the covariance matrix
R = Σ − ΣwwTΣ(Φd(0)2γ2)−1φd(0))d2(0) in which
γ = (wTΣw)
1
2 [30].
As it can be seen in (5), the mean is a function of both
the covariance matrix Σ and w. Our ultimate goal is to es-
timate the normal vector to the decision boundary. In order
to recover w from µ, a sufficient condition is to choose Σ
to be a full rank matrix.
General case We first consider the case where no prior
information on the search space is available. The matrix
Σ = σI can be a simple choice to avoid unnecessary com-
putations. The direction of the mean of the truncated dis-
tribution is an estimation for the direction of hyperplane
normal vector as µ = c1σw. The covariance matrix of
the truncated distribution is R = σI + c2wwT where
c2 = −σ2(Φd(0))−2φ2d(0). As the samples in both of the
sets Sadv and Sclean are hyperplane truncated Gaussian distri-
butions, the same estimation can be applied for the samples
in the set Sclean as well. Thus, by multiplying the samples
in Sclean by −1 and we can use them to approximate the de-
sired gradient to have a more efficient estimation. Hence,
the problem is reduced to the estimation of the mean of the
N samples drawn from the hyperplane truncated distribu-
tion with mean µ and covariance matrixR. As a result, the
estimator µ¯N of µ with N samples is µ¯N = 1N
∑N
i=1 ρiηi,
where
ρi =
{
1 kˆ(xB + ηi) 6= kˆ(x)
−1 kˆ(xB + ηi) = kˆ(x). (6)
The normalized direction of the normal vector of the bound-
ary can be obtained as:
wˆN =
µ¯N
‖µ¯N‖2 (7)
Perturbation priors We now consider the case where pri-
ors on the perturbations are available. In black-box settings,
having prior information can significantly improve the per-
formance of the attack. Although the attacker does not have
access to the weights of the classifier, it may have some
prior information about the data, classifier, etc. [21]. Here,
using Σ, we can capture the prior knowledge for the esti-
mation of the normal vector to the decision boundary. In
the following, we unify the two common priors in our pro-
posed estimator. In the first case, we have some prior in-
formation about the subspace in which we search for nor-
mal vectors, we can incorporate such information into Σ to
have a more efficient estimation. For instance, deploying
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low frequency sub-space Rm in which m  d, we can
generate a rank m covariance matrix Σ. Let us assume
that S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} is an orthonormal Discrete Co-
sine Transform (DCT) basis in them-dimensional subspace
of the input space [16]. In order to generate the samples
from this low dimensional subspace, we use the following
covariance matrix:
Σ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
sis
T
i . (8)
The normal vector of the boundary can be obtained by
plugging the modified Σ in (5). Second, we consider
transferability priors. It has been observed that adversar-
ial perturbations well transfer across different trained mod-
els [31, 26, 9]. Now, if the adversary further has full access
to another model T ′, yet different than the target black-box
model T , it can take advantage of the transferability proper-
ties of adversarial perturbations. For a given datapoint, one
can obtain the normal vector to the decision boundary in the
vicinity of the datapoint for T ′, and bias the normal vector
search space for the black-box classifier. Let us denote the
transferred direction with unit-norm vector g. By incorpo-
rating this vector into Σ, we can bias the search space as:
Σ = βI + (1− β)ggT (9)
where β ∈ [0, 1] adjusts the trade-off between exploitation
and exploration. Depending on how confident we are about
the utility of the transferred direction, we can adjust its con-
tribution by tuning the value of β. Substituting (9) into (5),
after normalization to c1, one can get
µ = βw + (1− β)ggTw, (10)
where the first term is the estimated normal vector to the
boundary and the second term is the projection of the esti-
mated normal vector on the transferred direction g. Having
incorporated the prior information into Σ, one can gener-
ate perturbations ηi ∼ N (0,Σ) with the modified Σ in an
effective search space, which leads to a more accurate esti-
mation of normal to the decision boundary.
Estimator bound Finally, we are interested in quantify-
ing the number of samples that are necessary for estimat-
ing the normal vectors in our geometry inspired framework.
Given a real i.i.d. sequence, using the central limit theorem,
if the samples have a finite variance, an asymptotic bound
can be provided for the estimate. However, this bound is not
of our interest as it is only asymptotically correct. We are
interested in bounds of similar form with non-asymptotic
inequalities as the number of queries is limited [23, 17].
Lemma 2. The mean estimation µ¯N deployed in (9) ob-
tained from N multivariate hyperplane truncated Gaussian
Algorithm 1: `p GeoDA (with optimal query distribu-
tion) for p > 1
1 Inputs: Original image x, query budget N , λ, number
of iterations T .
2 Output: Adversarial example xT .
3 Obtain the optimal query distribution N∗t ,∀t by (19).
4 Find a starting point on the boundary x0.
5 for t = 1 : T do
6 Estimate normal wˆN∗t at xt−1 by N
∗
t queries.
7 Obtain vt according to (13).
8 rˆt ← min{r′ > 0 : kˆ(x+ r′vt) 6= kˆ(x)}
9 xt ← x+ rˆtwˆN∗t
queries satisfies the probability
P
(
‖µ¯N − µ‖ ≤
√
Tr(R)
N
+
√
2λmax log(1/δ)
N
)
≥ 1−δ
(11)
where Tr(R) and λmax denote the trace and largest eigen-
value of the covariance matrixR, respectively.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix A.
This bound will be deployed in sub-section 5.1 to com-
pute the optimal distribution of queries over iterations.
5. Geometric decision-based attacks (GeoDA)
Based on the estimator provided in Section 4, one can
design efficient black-box evaluation methods. In this pa-
per, we focus on the minimal `p-norm perturbations, i.e.,
D(x,x + v) = ‖v‖p. We first describe the general algo-
rithm for `p perturbations, and then provide algorithms to
find black-box perturbations for p = 1, 2,∞. Furthermore,
for p = 2, we prove the convergence of our method. The
linearized optimization problem in (2) can be re-written as
min
v
‖v‖p
s.t. wT (x+ v)−wTxB = 0. (12)
In the black-box setting, one needs to estimate xB and w
in order to solve this optimization problem. The boundary
point xB can be found using a similar approach as [22].
Having xB , one then use the process described in Section 4
to compute the estimator of w – i.e.,wˆN1 – by making N1
queries to the classifier. In the case of p = 2, the estimated
direction wˆN is indeed the direction of the minimal pertur-
bation. This process is depicted in Fig. 1.
If the curvature of the decision boundary is exactly zero,
the solution of this problem gives the direction of the min-
imal `p perturbation. However, for deep neural networks,
even if N → ∞, the obtained direction is not completely
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aligned with the minimal perturbation as these networks
still have a small yet non-zero curvature (see Fig. 4c). Nev-
ertheless, to overcome this issue, the solution v∗ of (12)
can be used to obtain a boundary point x1 = x + rˆ1v∗ to
the original image x than x0, for an appropriate value of
rˆ1 > 0. For notation consistency, we define x0 = xB .
Now, we can again solve (12) for the new boundary point
x1. Repeating this process results in an iterative algorithm
to find the minimal `p perturbation, where each iteration
corresponds to solving (12) once. Formally, for a given im-
age x, let xt be the boundary point estimated in the iteration
t−1. Also, letNt be the number of queries used to estimate
the normal to the decision boundary wˆNt at the iteration t.
Hence, the (normalized) solution to (12) in the t-th iteration,
vt, can be written in closed-form as:
vt =
1
‖wˆNt‖ pp−1
 sign(wˆNt), (13)
for p ∈ [1,∞), where  is the point-wise product. For the
particular case of p = ∞, the solution of (13) is simply
reduced to:
vt = sign(wˆNt). (14)
The cases of the p = 1, 2 are presented later. In all cases,
xt is then updated according to the following update rule:
xt = x+ rˆtvt (15)
where rˆt can be found using an efficient line search along
vt. The general algorithm is summarized in Alg. 1.
5.1. `2 perturbation
In the `2 case, the update rule of (15) is reduced to
xt = x + rˆtwˆNt where rˆt is the `2 distance of x to the
decision boundary at iteration t. We propose convergence
guarantees and optimal distribution of queries over the suc-
cessive iterations for this case.
Convergence guarantees We prove that GeoDA con-
verges to the minimal `2 perturbation given that the cur-
vature of the decision boundary is bounded. We define the
curvature of the decision boundary as κ = 1R , where R is
the radius of the largest open ball included in the region that
intersects with the boundary B [12]. In case N → ∞, then
rˆt → rt where rt is assumed as exact distance required to
push the image x towards the boundary at iteration t with
direction vt. The following Theorem holds:
Theorem 1. Given a classifier with decision boundary of
bounded curvature with κr < 1, the sequence {rˆt} gener-
ated by Algorithm 1 converges linearly to the minimum `2
distance r since we have:
lim
t→∞
rˆt+1 − r
rˆt − r = λ (16)
where λ < 1 is the convergence rate.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Optimal query distribution In practice, however, the
number of queriesN is limited. One natural question is how
should one choose the number of queries in each iteration
of GeoDA. It can be seen in the experiments that allocating
a smaller number of queries for the first iterations and then
increasing it in each iteration can improve the convergence
rate of the GeoDA. At early iterations, noisy normal vector
estimates are fine because the noise is smaller relative to the
potential improvement, whereas in later iterations noise has
a bigger impact. This makes the earlier iterations cheaper in
terms of queries, potentially speeding up convergence [11].
We assume a practical setting in which we have a limited
budgetN for the number of queries as the target system may
block if the number of queries increases beyond a certain
threshold [7]. The goal is to obtain the optimal distribution
of the queries over the iterations.
Theorem 2. Given a limited query budget N , the bounds
for the GeoDA `2 perturbation error for total number of
iterations T can be obtained as:
λT (r0 − r)− e(N) ≤ rˆt − r ≤ λT (r0 − r) + e(N) (17)
where e(N) = γ
∑T
i=1
λT−iri√
Ni
is the error due to limited
number of queries, γ =
√
Tr(R) +
√
2λmax log(1/δ) and
Nt is the number of queries to estimate the normal vector
to the boundary at point xt−1, and r0 = ‖x− x0‖.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
As in (17), the error in the convergence is due to two
factors: (i) curvature of the decision boundary (ii) limited
number of queries. If the number of iterations increases,
the effect of the curvature can vanish. However, the term
γ ri√
Nt
is not small enough as the number of queries is finite.
Having unlimited number of the queries, the error term due
to queries can vanish as well. However, given a limited
number of queries, what should be the distribution of the
queries to alleviate such an error? We define the following
optimization problem:
min
N1,...,NT
T∑
i=1
λ−iri√
Ni
s.t.
T∑
i=1
Ni ≤ N (18)
where the objective is to minimize the error e(N) while the
query budget constraint is met over all iterations.
Theorem 3. The optimal numbers of queries for (18) in
each iteration form geometric sequence with the common
ratio N
∗
t+1
N∗t
≈ λ− 23 , where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Moreover, we have
N∗t ≈
λ−
2
3 t∑T
i=1 λ
− 23 i
N. (19)
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 2: Performance evaluation of GeoDA for `p when p = 1, 2 (a) Comparison for the performance of GeoDA, BA, and
HSJA for `2 norm. (b) Comparison for the number of required iterations in GeoDA, BA, and HSJA. (c) Fooling rate vs.
sparsity for different numbers of queries in sparse GeoDA.
5.2. `1 perturbation (sparse case)
The framework proposed by GeoDA is general enough
to find sparse adversarial perturbations in the black-box set-
ting as well. The sparse adversarial perturbations can be
computed using the following optimization problem with
box constraints as:
min
v
‖v‖1
s.t. wT (x+ v)−wTxB = 0
l  x+ v  u (20)
In the box constraint l  x + v  u, l and u denote
the lower and upper bounds of the values of x + v. We
can estimate the normal vector wˆN and the boundary point
xB similarly to the `2 case with N queries. Now, the
decision boundary B is approximated with the hyperplane
{x : wˆTN (x−xB) = 0}. The goal is to find the top-k coor-
dinates of the normal vector wˆN with minimum k and push-
ing them to extreme values of the valid range depending on
the sign of the coordinate until it hits the approximated hy-
perplane. In order to find the minimum k, we deploy binary
search for a d-dimensional image. Here, we just consider
one iteration for the sparse attack., while the initial point
of the sparse case is obtained using the GeoDA for `2 case.
The detailed Algorithm for the sparse version of GeoDA is
given in Algorithm 2.
6. Experiments
6.1. Settings
We evaluate our algorithms on a pre-trained ResNet-
50 [18] with a set X of 350 correctly classified and ran-
domly selected images from the ILSVRC2012’s validation
set [10]. All the images are resized to 224× 224× 3.
To evaluate the performance of the attack we deploy the
median of the `p norm for p = 2,∞ distance over all tested
samples, defined by median
x∈X
(
‖x−xadv‖p
)
. For sparse per-
Algorithm 2: Sparse GeoDA
1 Inputs: Original image x, query budget N , λ,
projection operator Q.
2 Output: Sparsely perturbed xadv, sparsity s.
3 Obtain xB , wˆN with N queries by `2 GeoDA
algorithm.
4 ml = 0, mu = d, J = round(log2(d)) + 1
5 for j = 1 : J do
6 k = round(mu+ml2 )
7 Obtain top k absolute values of coordinates of wˆN
as wˆsp.
8 xj ← Q(x+ ν sign(wˆsp))
9 if wˆTN (xj − xB) > 0 then
10 mu = k
11 else
12 ml = k
13 xadv ← xj , s← mu
turbations, we measure the performance by fooling rate de-
fined as |x ∈ X : kˆ(x) 6= kˆ(xadv)|/|X |. In evaluation of
the sparse GeoDA, we define sparsity as the percentage of
the perturbed coordinates of the given image
6.2. Performance analysis
Black-box attacks for `p norms. We compare the per-
formance of the GeoDA with state of the art attacks for `p
norms. There are several attacks in the literature includ-
ing Boundary attack [2], HopSkipJump attack [5], qFool
[22], and OPT attack [8]. In our experiments, we compare
GeoDA with Boundary attack, qFool and HopSkipJump at-
tack. We do not compare our algorithm with OPT attack
as HopSkipJump already outperforms it considerably [5].
In our algorithm, the optimal distribution of the queries is
obtained for any given number of queries for `2 case. The
results for `2 and `∞ for different numbers of queries is
6
Queries `2 `∞ Iterations Gradients
1000 47.92 0.297 40 -
Boundary attack [2] 5000 24.67 0.185 200 -
20000 5.13 0.052 800 -
1000 16.05 - 3 -
qFool [5] 5000 7.52 - 3 -
20000 1.12 - 3 -
1000 14.56 0.062 6 -
HopSkipJump attack [5] 5000 4.01 0.031 17 -
20000 1.85 0.012 42 -
1000 11.76 0.053 6 -
GeoDA-fullspace 5000 3.35 0.022 10 -
20000 1.06 0.009 14 -
1000 8.16 0.022 6 -
GeoDA-subspace 5000 2.51 0.008 10 -
20000 1.01 0.003 14 -
DeepFool (white-box) [27] - 0.026 - 2 20
C&W (white-box) [3] - 0.034 - 10000 10000
Table 1: The performance comparison of GeoDA with BA and HSJA for median `2 and `∞ on ImageNet dataset.
Queries Fooling rate Perturbation
500 88.44% 4.29%
GeoDA 2000 90.25% 3.04%
10000 91.17% 2.36%
SparseFool [2] - 100% 0.23%
Table 2: The performance comparison of black-box sparse
GeoDA for median sparsity compared to white box attack
SparseFool [2] on ImageNet dataset.
depicted in Table 1. GeoDA can outperform the-state-of-
the-art both in terms of smaller perturbations and number
of iterations, which has the benefit of parallelization. In
particular, the images can be fed into multiple GPUs with
larger batch size. In Fig. 2a, the `2 norm of GeoDA, Bound-
ary attack and HopSkipJump are compared. As shown,
GeoDA can outperform the HopSkipJump attack especially
when the number of queries is small. By increasing the
number of queries, the performance of GeoDA and Hop-
SkipJump are getting closer. In Fig. 2b, the number of iter-
ations versus the number of queries for different algorithms
are compared. As depicted, GeoDA needs fewer iterations
compared to HopSkipJump and BA when the number of
queries increases. Thus, on the one hand GeoDA generates
smaller `2 perturbations compared to the HopSkipJump at-
tack when the number of queries is small, on the other hand,
it saves significant computation time due to parallelization
of queries fed into the GPU.
Now, we evaluate the performance of GeoDA for gen-
erating sparse perturbations. In Fig. 2c, the fooling rate
versus sparsity is depicted. In experiments, we observed
that instead of using the boundary point xB in the sparse
GeoDA, the performance of the algorithm can be improved
by further moving towards the other side of the hyperplane
boundary. Thus, we use xB + ζ(xB − x), where ζ ≥ 0.
The parameter ζ can adjust the trade-off between the fool-
ing rate and the sparsity. It is observed that the higher the
value for ζ, the higher the fooling rate and the sparsity and
vice versa. In other words, choosing small values for ζ pro-
duces sparser adversarial examples; however, it decreases
the chance that it is an adversarial example for the actual
boundary. In Fig. 2c, we depicted the trade-off between
fooling rate and sparsity by increasing the value for ζ for
different query budgets. The larger the number of queries,
the closer the initial point to the original image, and also the
better our algorithm performs in generating sparse adver-
sarial examples. In Table 2, the sparse GeoDA is compared
with the white-box attack SparseFool. We show that with
a limited number of queries, GeoDA can generate sparse
perturbations with acceptable fooling rate with sparsity of
about 3 percent with respect to the white-box attack Sparse-
Fool. The adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA
for `p norms are shown in Fig. 3 and the effect of different
norms can be observed.
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Figure 3: Original images and adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA for `2 fullspace, `2 subspace, `∞ fullspace, `∞
subspace, and `1 sparse with N = 10000 queries. (Perturbations are magnified ∼ 10× for better visibility.)
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Figure 4: (a) The effect of the variance σ on the ratio of correctly classified queries C to the total number of queries N at
boundary point xB . (b) Effect of λ on the performance of the algorithm. (c) Comparison of two extreme cases of query
distributions, i.e., single iteration (λ→ 0) and uniform distribution (λ = 1) with optimal distribution (λ = 0.6).
Incorporating prior information. Here, we evaluate the
methods proposed in Section 4 to incorporate prior infor-
mation in order to improve the estimation of the normal
vector to the decision boundary. As sub-space priors, we
deploy the DCT basis functions in which m low frequency
subspace directions are chosen [25]. As shown in Fig. 5, bi-
asing the search space to the DCT sub-space can reduce the
`2 norm of the perturbations by approximately 27% com-
pared to the full-space case. For transferrability, we obtain
the normal vector of the given image using the white box
attack DeepFool [27] on a ResNet-34 classifier. We bias the
search space for normal vector estimation as described in
Section 4. As it can be seen in Fig. 5, prior information can
improve the normal vector estimation significantly.
6.3. Effect of hyper-parameters on the performance
Instead of throwing out the gradient obtained from the
previous iterations, we can take advantage of them in next
iterations as well. To do this, we can bias the covariance
matrix Σ towards the gradient obtained from the previous
iteration. The other way is to simply have a weighted av-
erage of the estimated gradient and previous gradients. As
a general rule, β given in (10) should be chosen in such a
way that the estimated gradient in recent iterations get more
weights compared to the first iterations.
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Figure 5: Effect of prior information, i.e., DCT sub-space
and transferability on the performance of `2 perturbation.
In practice, we need to choose σ such that the locally flat
assumption of the boundary is preserved. Upon generating
the queries at boundary point xB to estimate the direction of
the normal vector as in (7), the value for σ is chosen in such
a way that the number of correctly classified images and
adversarial images on the boundary are almost the same. In
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Fig. 4a, the effect of variance σ of added Gaussian pertur-
bation on the number of correctly classified queries on the
boundary point is illustrated. We obtained a random point
xB on the decision boundary of the image classifier and
query the image classifier 1000 times. As it can be seen, the
variance σ is too small, none of the queries is correctly clas-
sified as the point xB is not exactly on the boundary. It is
worth mentioning that in binary search we choose the point
on the adversarial side as a boundary point. On the other
hand if the variance is too high, all the images are classified
as adversarial since they are highly perturbed.
In order to obtain the optimal query distribution for a
given limited budget N , the values for λ and T should be
given. Having fixed λ, if T is large, the number of queries
allocated to the first iteration may be too small. To address
this, we consider a fixed number of queries for the first it-
eration as N∗1 = 70. Thus, having fixed λ, a reasonable
choice for T can be obtained by solving (19) for T . Based
on (19), if λ → 0, all the queries are allocated to the last
iteration and when λ = 1, the query distribution is uniform.
A value between these two extremes is desirable for our al-
gorithm. To obtain this value, we run our algorithm for dif-
ferent λ for only 10 images different from X . As it can be
seen in Fig. 4b, the algorithm has its worst performance
when λ is close to the two extreme cases: single iteration
(λ → 0) and uniform distribution (λ = 1). We thus choose
the value λ = 0.6 for our experiments. Finally, in Fig. 4c,
the comparison between three different query distributions
is shown. The optimal query distribution achieves the best
performance while the single iteration preforms worst. Ac-
tually, the fact that the single iteration performs worst is
reflected in our proposed bound in (17) as even with infinite
number of queries it can not do better than λ(r0−r). Indeed
the effect of curvature can be addressed only by increasing
the number of iterations.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a new geometric framework for
designing query-efficient decision-based black-box attacks,
in which the attacker only has access to the top-1 label of
the classifier. Our method relies on the key observation that
the curvature of the decision boundary of deep networks is
small in the vicinity of data samples. This permits to es-
timate the normals to the decision boundary with a small
number of queries to the classifier, hence to eventually de-
sign query-efficient `p-norm attacks. In the particular case
of `2-norm attacks, we show theoretically that our algorithm
converges to the minimal adversarial perturbations, and that
the number of queries at each step of the iterative search
can be optimized mathematically. We finally study GeoDA
through extensive experiments that confirm its superior per-
formance compared to state-of-the-art black-box attacks.
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8. Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let Xi be a random vector taking values in Rd with
mean µ = E[X] and covariance matrix R = E(X −
µ)(X − µ)T . Given the X1, . . . , Xn, the goal is to esti-
mate µ. If X has a multivariate Gaussian or sub-Gaussian
distribution, the sample mean µ¯N = 1N
∑N
i=1Xi is the re-
sult of MLE estimation, which satisfies, with probability at
least 1− δ
||µ¯N − µ|| ≤
√
Tr(R)
N
+
√
2λmax log(1/δ)
N
(21)
where Tr(R) and λmax denote the trace and largest eigen-
value of the covariance matrix R, respectively [17]. We
already know the truncated normal distribution mean and
variance. Although, the truncated distribution is similar to
Gaussian, we need to prove that it satisfies the sub-Gaussian
distribution property so that we can use the bound in (21).
The truncated distribution with mean µ and covariance
matrix R is a sub-Gaussian distribution. A given distribu-
tion is sub-Gaussian if for all unit vectors {v ∈ Rd : ||v|| =
1} [23], the following condition holds
E [exp(λ〈v, X − µ〉)] ≤ exp(cλ2〈v,Σv〉). (22)
Assuming the hyperplanewTX ≥ 0 truncated Normal dis-
tribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ, the left
hand side of the (13) can be computed as:
E [exp(λ〈v, X − µ〉)] =
∫
H+
exp(λvTX)φd(X|Σ)dX
(23)
where H+ = {X ∈ Rd : wTX ≥ 0}. Since R is a sym-
metric, positive definite matrix, using Cholesky decomposi-
tion we can have R−1 = ΨTΨ where Ψ is a non-singular,
upper triangular matrix [19]. By transforming the variables,
we have Y = ΨX . Using Y , with some manipulation as in
[30], one can get
E [exp(λ〈v, X − µ〉)] = exp
(
1
2
λ2vTΣv
)
Φ
[
λwTΣv
σ
]
(24)
and σ2 = wTΣw, and Φ[.] is the cumulative distribu-
tion function of the univariate normal distribution. Plugging
Σ = I, one can get
E [exp(λ〈v, X〉)] = exp
(
1
2
λ2
)
Φ
[
λwTv
]
≤ exp
(
1
2
λ2
)
, (25)
where the inequality is valid due to the fact that the CDF
function is equal to 1 in the maximum. Comparing with the
right hand side of the (13):
exp
(
1
2
λ2
)
≤ exp
(
1
2
cλ2
)
, (26)
one can see that it is valid for any c ≥ 1. Thus, the truncated
Normal distribution is a sub-Gaussian distribution.
The above proof is consistent with our intuition as the
truncated Gaussian has the tails approaching zero at least as
fast as exponential distribution. The truncated part of the
Gaussian is already equal to zero so there is no chance for
being a heavy tailed distribution. Thus, the bound provided
in (21) can be valid for our problem [23].
Since the covariance matrix R is unknown, we need to
find bounds for Tr(R) and λmax as well. It can easily be
obtained that
Tr(R) = d+ c2wTw = d+ c2 (27)
In order to obtain the maximum eigenvalue of the R, we
use Weyl’s inequality to have an upper bound for largest
eigenvalue of the covariance matrix as [24]:
λmax(A+B) ≤ λmax(A) + λmax(B) (28)
The largest eigenvalue for the identity matrix I is 1. For
the rank-1 matrix c2wwT which is the outer product of the
normal vector is given by:
λmax(c2ww
T ) = c2Tr(wwT ) = c2wTw = c2 (29)
which immediately results in λmax(R) ≤ 1 + c2. Sub-
stituting the above values to the (12), the sample mean
µ¯N =
1
N
∑N
i=1Xi is the result of MLE estimation, which
satisfies, with probability at least 1− δ
‖µ¯N − µ‖ ≤
√
d+ c2
N
+
√
2(1 + c2) log(1/δ)
N
(30)
This bound can provide an upper bound with probability at
least 1− δ for the error of the sample mean while getting N
queries from the neural network.
R
sin(θt)
=
rt
sin(θt+1)
(31)
B. Proof of Theorem 1
In the following subsections, we consider two cases for
the curvature of the boundary.
Convex Curved Bounded Boundary
We assume that the curvature of the boundary is convex as
given in Fig. 6. As given in [12], if θt satisfies the two
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Gradient Direction
Figure 6: Convex decision boundary with bounded curva-
ture.
assumptions tan2 (θt) ≤ 0.2R/r and r/R < 1, the value
for ‖xt − x0‖2 = rt is given as follows:
rt = −(R− r) cos(θt) +
√
(R− r)2 cos2(θt) + 2Rr − r2
(32)
where ‖xt+1 − x0‖2 = rt+1 can be obtained in a similar
way. It can be observed that the value of the rt is an increas-
ing function of the θt because:
∂rt
∂θt
= (R− r) sin(θt)
− (R− r)
2 cos(θt) sin(θt)√
(R− r)2 cos2(θt) + 2Rr − r2
, (33)
Setting ∂rt∂θt > 0, with some manipulations one can get
2R > r which shows that rt is an increasing function of
the θt. Thus, if we can show that θt > θt+1, it means that
rt > rt+1 which means that rt can converge to r. Here, we
assume that the given image is in the vicinity of the bound-
ary r/R < 1. The line connecting point o to x0 intersects
the two parallel lines. Based on the law of sines, one can get
Since rt < R, one can conclude that θt > θt+1 using the
sines law. Thus, as rt is an increasing function of θt, we can
get rt+1 < rt. Thus, after several iterations, the following
update rule
xt = x0 + rtwˆNt (34)
converges to the minimum perturbation r.
Applying the sine law for k iterations, one can get the
following equation using (31):
sin(θt) =
∏t
i=0 ri
Rt
sin(θ0) (35)
We know that rt < R and in each iteration, it gets smaller
and smaller. Thus, for the convergence, we consider the
worst case. We know that maxi=0,1,...,t{ri} = rt. Thus, To
Gradient Direction
Figure 7: Concave decision boundary with bounded curva-
ture.
bound this, we can have:
sin(θt+K) =
∏K
k=0 rt+k
RK
sin(θt) ≤ (rt
R
)K sin(θt) (36)
where can be reduced to
sin(θt+K) ≤ (rt
R
)K sin(θt) (37)
This shows that sin(θt+K) converges to zero exponentially
since rt < R. Thus, θt+k goes to zero which results that
the in coinciding the rt and r in the same magnitude. Thus,
we have
lim
k→∞
rt+k = r (38)
We already know that
rt+1 =− (R− r) cos(θt+1)
+
√
(R− r)2 cos2(θt+1) + 2Rr − r2, (39)
Considering the cosine law, based on the figure, we can see
that
r2t = (R+ r)
2 +R2 − 2R(R+ r) cos(θt+1) (40)
By combining the above equations and eliminating the
cos(θt+1), one can get:
rt+1 = −(R− r) (R+ r)
2 +R2 − r2t
2R(R+ r)
+
√
(R− r)2((R+ r)2 +R2 − r2t )2
4R2(R+ r)2
+ 2Rr − r2,
(41)
Plugging (41) into the following limit,
lim
t→∞
rt+1 − r
rt − r (42)
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for t→∞, we get 00 . Thus, using the L’Hospital’s Rule, we
take the derivative of the numerator and the denominator as:
∂rt+1
∂rt
= −rt(R− r)
R(R+ r)
+
((R+ r)2 +R2 − r2t )rt
2
√
(R−r)2((R+r)2+R2−r2t )2
4R2(R+r)2 + 2Rr − r2
(R− r)2
R2(R+ r)2
(43)
Having t→∞, we can get rt → r, since we have rˆt → rt,
thus:
lim
t→∞
rˆt+1 − r
rˆt − r =
r2(R− r)
R2(R+ r)
= λ < 1 (44)
As r < R, the rate of convergence λ ∈ (0, 1) which com-
pletes the proof.
Concave Curved Bounded Boundary
As in [12], the value for ‖xt−x0‖2 = rt is given as follows:
rt = (R+ r) cos(θt)−
√
(R+ r)2 cos2(θt)− 2Rr − r2
(45)
where ‖xt+1 − x0‖2 = rt+1 can be obtained in a similar
way. It can easily be seen that the θt > θt+1. Assuming
r/R < 1, rt is a decreasing function with respect to θt
which results in rt < rt+1. Similar proof of convergence
can be obtained for this case as well.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Given the point rt−1, the goal is to find the estimate of
the rˆt with limited query. Assuming the normalized version
of the true gradient wt = µt/‖µt‖2, we have
‖wˆNt −wt‖ ≤
γ√
Nt
(46)
where γ =
√
Tr(R) +
√
2λmax log(1/δ), wˆNt is the esti-
mated gradient at iteration t andNt is the number of queries
to estimate the gradient at point xt−1. Based on the reverse
triangle inequality ‖x‖ − ‖y‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖, we can have
‖wˆNt‖ − 1 ≤ ‖wˆNt −wt‖ ≤
γ√
Nt
. (47)
Multiplying by rt, we have:
rt − γrt√
Nt
≤ rˆt ≤ rt + γrt√
Nt
. (48)
where rˆt = rt‖wˆNt‖. Here, we conduct the analysis in the
limit sense and we observe in the simulations that it is valid
in limited iterations as well. Given rt−1, for large t, we
have:
rt − r ≈ λ(rt−1 − r) (49)
Considering the best and worst case for the estimated gra-
dient, we can find the following bound. In particular, the
best case is the case in which all the gradient errors are con-
structive and make the rˆt in each iteration smaller than rt.
In contrast, the worst case happens when all the gradients
directions are destructive and make the rˆt greater than rt.
In practice, however, what is happening is something in be-
tween. Substituting rt from (48) in (49), one can obtain:
λ(rt−1− r)− γrt√
Nt
≤ rˆt− r ≤ λ(rt−1− r) + γrt√
Nt
(50)
By using the iterative equation, one can get the following
bound:
λt(r0 − r)− e(N) ≤ rˆt − r ≤ λt(r0 − r) + e(N) (51)
where e(N) = γ
∑t
i=1
λt−iri√
Ni
is the error due to limited
number of queries.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
It can easily be observed that the optimization problem
is convex. Thus, the duality gap between this problem and
its dual optimization problem is zero. Therefore, we can
solve the given problem by solving its dual problem. The
Lagrangian is given by:
L(N , α) =
T∑
i=1
λ−iri√
Ni
+ α
(
T∑
i=1
Ni −N
)
(52)
where α is the non-negative dual variable associated with
the budget constraint. The KKT conditions are given as fol-
lows [1]:
∂L(N , α)
∂Nt
= 0, ∀i (53)
α
(
T∑
i=0
Ni −N
)
= 0 (54)
T∑
i=1
Ni ≤ N (55)
Based on (53), taking the derivative and setting equal to
zero, we can have
Nt =
(
λ−trt
2α
) 2
3
(56)
We see that the constraint holds with equality. Assume that∑t
i=0Ni 6= N , then based on (54), α = 0. If α = 0 then
based on (56), we have Ni =∞, ∀i which contradicts with
(55). Substituting (56) in
∑t
i=0Ni = N , the Lagrangian
multiplier can be obtained as
α
2
3 =
1
2
2
3
∑T
i=1(λ
−iri)
2
3
N
(57)
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Substituting α in (56), one can get the optimal number of
queries as:
N∗t =
(λ−trt)
2
3∑T
i=1(λ
−iri)
2
3
N (58)
For t→∞, we have rt → r. Based on this, the ratio of the
optimal number if queries for each iteration is given by:
N∗t ≈
λ−
2
3 t∑T
i=1 λ
− 23 i
N (59)
This equation shows that the distribution of the queries
should be increased by a factor of λ−
2
3 where 0 < λ < 1.
By approximation, we have
N∗t+1
N∗t
≈ λ− 23 (60)
which completes the proof.
9. Additional experiment results
Here we show more experiments on the performance of
GeoDA on different `p norms. In Figs. 8, Figs. 9, Figs. 10,
and Figs. 11, we have generated adversarial examples using
GeoDA. For each image, the first row consists of (from left
to right) original image, `2 fullspace adversarial example,
`2 subspace adversarial example, `∞ fullspace adversarial
example, `∞ subspace adversarial example, and `1 adver-
sarial example, respectively. However, as can be seen the
perturbations are not quite visible in the actual adversarial
examples in the first row. In the second row, we show the
magnified version of perturbations for `2 and `∞. To do so,
the norm of all the perturbations is magnified to 100 given
that the images coordinate normalized to the 0 to 1 scale.
For the sparse case, we do not magnify the perturbations
as they are visible and equal to their maximum (minimum)
values. Finally, in the third row, we added a magnified ver-
sion of the perturbation with norm of 30 to have a better
visualization.
Queries ResNet-50 ResNet-101
500 11.76 17.91
GeoDA (`2) 2000 3.35 6.38
10000 1.06 1.87
Table 3: The performance comparison of GeoDA on differ-
ent ResNet image classifiers.
In Table 3, we have compared the performance of
GeoDA with different deep network image classifiers. The
proposed algorithm GeoDA follows almost the same trend
on a wide variety of deep networks. The reason is that the
core assumption of GeoDA, i.e. boundary has a low mean
curvature in vicinity of the datapoints, is verified empiri-
cally for a wide variety of deep networks. We can provide
the experimental results on different networks.
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Figure 8: Original images and adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA for `2 fullspace, `2 subspace, `∞ fullspace, `∞
subspace, and `1 sparse with N = 10000 queries.
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Figure 9: Original images and adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA for `2 fullspace, `2 subspace, `∞ fullspace, `∞
subspace, and `1 sparse with N = 10000 queries.
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Figure 10: Original images and adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA for `2 fullspace, `2 subspace, `∞ fullspace,
`∞ subspace, and `1 sparse with N = 10000 queries.
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Figure 11: Original images and adversarial perturbations generated by GeoDA for `2 fullspace, `2 subspace, `∞ fullspace,
`∞ subspace, and `1 sparse with N = 10000 queries.
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